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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE ST'A TE OF UTAH
~rrATE

ROAD COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Pla.intiff an.d Appellant,
-vs.-

,

urr1\.H POWER & LIGHT COM- \
P ANY, a corporation; MOUNTAIN \
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a r·
corporation, and MOUNTAIN
STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELGRAPH COMPANY, a corporation,
Defen.da.n.ts an.d Respondents.

Case
No. 9163

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced by the State Road Commission and challenges on constitutional grounds the
validity of Chapter 53 of the 1957 Session Laws of Utah,
no\v Section 27-2-7, Subsection (22), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This section is commonly ref erred to as the
utility relocation act and in substance provides that the
appellant here will pay all of the costs incurred by a util-

1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ity incident to relocating its facilities when the same
becomes necessary by reason of interstate highway construction. No distinction is made as to whether the existing facility is within or without the right-of-way of the
existing highway, and the only condition to payment is
that the ·state highway department be in a position to
obtain proportionate reimbursement from federal funds.
The complaint of the State Road Commission alleged
that the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company had been granted a franchise by Davis County to
erect and maintain telephone poles an~ .wires within the
right of way of a county road known as Howard Street.
A portion of this county road will now become a part of
the national system of interstate and defense highways
and the poles and wires of the telephone co~pany must
be removed and relocated.
As to Mountain Fuel Supply Company, the complaint
alleged that there were located certain facilities within
the right-of-way boundaries of Seventh East Street in
Salt Lake City, Utah, by virtue of a franchise granted by
the city. This street from Thirteenth South Street to
Simpson Avenue has been designed as a federal aid secondary highway and the present widening of this street
will require the relocation of the fuel company's facilities.
Utah Power and Light Company is also the recipient of a franchise from Salt Lake City that permits the
erection of p.<;>les and electric light and power lines within
the right-of-way of the city streets. Interstate highway

2
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construction along Sixth West Street between North
rremple and Fifth North Streets necessitate the relocation of these facilities.
In all three instances the utility h~s demanded of
the State Road Commission that it paythe costs incurred
in the relocation of the facilities of the utility. The Commission contends that it cannot legally make such payment and this action is brought under the provisions of
the Declaratory Judgments Act, Chapter 33 of Title 78,
·Utah Code Annotated, 1953_, to determine the controversy.
After the complaint was filed, the three defendant
utilities answered effectively admitting the factual allegations but denying that the act_ in question was unconstitutional.. Both parties thereupon filed separate motions
for judgment on the pleadings. The c·ourt below denied
the motion of the plaintiff, granted that of the defendants,
held the Utility Relocation Act to be constitutional and
ordered the State Road Commission to reimburse the defendant utilities for their relocation costs. This appeal is
taken from that judgment.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 53,
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, VIOLATES SECTION
27 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
3
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PoiNT

II.

SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 53,
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, VIOLATES SECTION
31 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 53,
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, VIOLATES SECTION
27 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
PoiNT

n.

SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 53,
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, VIOLATES SECTION
31 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
The arguments to be hereinafter advanced in support
of the position of the State Road Commission can be best
combined as to both points in order to avoid needless
repetition.
We commence with the assertion, that we believe to
be unassailable, that it is a proper exercise of the police
power of the state in requiring public utilities to relocate
at their own expense facilities placed on public land whenever that relocation is justified by the need of the state to
make a greater use of its lands and of its streets and
highways. This principle is sustained in the case of
4
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v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
230 U. S. 58, and inN ew Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage
Com;nission of New Orleans, 197 U. S. 453, 25 S. Ct. 471,
49 Ij. Ed. 831.

Oll'e'nsboro

The 1957 Utah State Legislature now seeks to change
this established rule and to require that the state assume
this entire cost of relocation. We maintain that this operates to release and extinguish an obligation and liability
presently existing in favor of the state and that it operates to lend the credit of the state to these utilities that
benefit thereunder.
The Federal Highway Act of 1956 first permitted reimbursement to the state of the payment of relocation
costs of utilities but provided that ''federal funds shall
not be used to reimburse the state under this section when
the payment to the utility violates the law of the state or
violates a legal contract between the utility and the state.''
23 U. S. C. A., Sec. 123.

rrhe United States Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Public Roads, has issued a policy and procedure memorandum No. 30-4 and Section 3(2) contains a requirement
'~that

the state certifies that payment for the utility relo-

cation is not in violation of the laws of the state or any
legal contract between the utility and the state. If there
should be any question as to the state's authority to pay
for such relocation, the state may be required to cite
or establish its authority to pay for such relocation.''

5
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Since the enactment of the quoted provision by the
Federal Highway Act of 1956, a number of states have
passed amendments to their state highway codes in order
to enable their highway commissions to pay utility relocation costs a~d secure proportionate reimbursement with
federal funds. The legislative action in this respect has
had judicial review in seven states in which a statute similar to the Utah statute was involved. In addition, the
general question of the costs of relocating utilities has
been before the courts of five other states. We believe it
proper in the present instance to comment on each of
these cases.
The five states, whose courts have reviewed the utility relocation problem, but without benefit of a specific
statute, are Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New
York and Kentucky.
In the case of Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Roads Commission, 214 Md. 266, 134 A. 2d 312, a petition
for a declaratory judgment was filed by the Commission
seeking an interpretation of a statute passed by the Maryland legislature. This legislation directed the Commission to build a tunnel under the Patapsco River in Baltimore Harbor as a. revenue bond project and the portion
of the statute under dispute read that ''all private prop'erty damaged or destroyed in carrying out the powers
granted by this sub-title shall be restored or repaired and
placed in its original condition a.s nearly as practicable or
adequate compensation made therefor * * *.''
The Court stated the problem as follows:
6
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"Unless the legislature directs to the contrary, the
rule is that .a public utility must, at its own expense, remove and relocate its service facilities, in,
on or under a public road or other land owned by
the state if this is made necessary by improvement
or extension of the road system. The question before us is whether the legislature, in authorizing
the State Roads Commission to build toll bridges,
tunnels and motorw~ys * * * changed this common law rule as to relocations required by the construction of revenue ·projects.''
The Court proceeded to hold that the section of the statute
quoted above did change the. common law rule in Maryland as to the relocation of utility facilities on revenue
bond projects.
In connection with this Maryland case; we would
direct attention to the -fact that it dealt with a revenue
bond project and did not involve either the release of an
obligation to the state nor a pledge of the credit of the
state. No constitutional questions were submitted to or
decided by the Court.
In the case of TVilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J.
360, 142 A. 2d 837, a taxpayers' suit sought to prevent
the city and its planning board from proceeding under the
Blighted Area Act on grounds that the act was unconstitutional. The Blighted Area Act provided in general
terms for community redevelopment by municipalities
after following certain required procedures and the act
itself made provision for the payment of the costs of utility relocation. This was attacked only on the grounds that
7
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it was discriminatory and that no similar provision was
made for the homeowner or the businessman.
The Court found that the act was not discriminatory,
that utilities are necessary adjuncts of the public welfare
and may be treated as a class, and that "the requirement
of equal protection is satisfied if all persons within a
class reasonably selected are treated alike. '' Again we
submit that there is no constitutional provision similar
to that in the Utah Constitution involved here.
In Delaware River Port Authority v. Pennsylvooia
Public Utility Commission, 393 Pa. 639, 145 A. 2d 172, the
Commission had entered an order requiring the Authority
to pay the entire cost of relocating certain facilities of an
electric company in connection with the construction of
the Walt Whitman bridge across the Delaware River.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the Commission had exceeded its authority in that the
statute gave it the power to direct such payment only to
utili ties engaged in the transportation of passengers or
property. The Court referred to the common law rule
requiring that utilities pay the entire cost of relocation
where their facilities were on the public right-of-way and
stated that "a legislative intent to effect any departure
from a firmly established policy of the law must be expressed in clear and unequivocal language.'' Again no
constitutional problem was presented or decided.
Of interest is the following quotation from the case of
Department of Highways v. Pennsylvarnia Public Utility
Commission, 185 Pa. Super. 1, 136 A. 2d 473:

8
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•'This situation encouraged the introduction of
bills in various state legislatures to require the
state (and thus the federal government) to pay for
the relocation of utilities located within the high\vay rights-of-way. Opposition to this proposed
legislation arose among automobile clubs, and
others, who saw in it a substantial reduction of
available funds for desperately needed highway
construction. For this and other reasons the proposals in most states were not enacted into law.

'·In Pennsylvania House Bill No. 984 (Session of
1957) passed the House and Senate, but was vetoed
by the Governor July 16, 1957. The bill provided
that whenever the Secretary of Highways should
determine that any utility located in, on, or above,
any highway should be relocated to accommodate
a reimbursable federal-aid highway project the
cost of relocation should be paid by the Commonwealth out of the Motor License Fund.''
The New York courts have dealt with this problem
as a statutory one only and have reached different conclusions depending upon the statute involved. An early
case, Oswego & Syra,cuse Ra,ilroa.d Co. v. Sta.te, 226 N.Y.
351, 124 N. E. 8, involved the required destruction and
rebuilding of a railroad bridge across a barge canal in
order to accommodate increased traffic and larger vessels.
The court determined that the statute in question required
the State of New York to pay the cost of rebuilding the
larger structure.
Again, in Westchester Electric Railroad Co. v. Westchester County Park Commission, 255 N.Y. 297, 174 N. E.
660, and based upon the statute authorizing the county
to build the Hutchinson River Parkway, the Court held
9
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that the Commission had the power to agree with a railroad and a gas company to reimburse them for necessary
expenses in relocating their facilities.
But, in Trarnsit Commissio.n v. Long Isl(}f'}'l;.(l Railroad
Company, 253 N.Y. 345, 171 N. E. 565, and in New York
Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison Co., 295 N. Y.
467, 68 N. E. 2d 445, contrary results were reached. In
the latter case, the Authority was created as a public corporation to construct the Queens Midtown Tunnel and
the project was to be financed through the issuance of
revenue bonds. Nonetheless, the Court construed the
statute as requiring that the utility pay its relocation
costs. In the first case cited in this paragraph a gas company was required to pay its relocation costs in connection with the elimination of a grade crossing by the use
of a highway overpass. The Court cited New Orlea;n.s Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission of New Orleans, supra.,
and quoted from this case as follows :
'' 'It would be unreasonable to suppose that in
the grant to the gas company of the right to use
the streets in the laying of its pipes it was ever
intended to surrender or impair the public right
to discharge the duty of conserving the public
health. The gas company did not acquire any specific location in the streets; it was content with
the general right to use them; and when it located
its pipes it was at the risk that they might be at
some future time, disturbed, when the state might
require for a necessary public use that changes in
location be made. * * * We see no reason why
the same principle should not apply to the subsurface of the streets, which, no less than the surface,
is primarily under public control. The need of

10
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occupation of the soil beneath the streets in cities
is constantly increasing, for the supply of water
and light and the construction of systems of sewerage and drainage; and every reason of public
policy requires that grants of rights in such subsurface shall be held subject .to such -reasonable
regulation as the public. health and safety may
require.' ''
And, finally the case of Southern Bell Telep·hone &
Telegraph Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 266 S. W.
2d 308, shows the following fact situation as taken from
the Court's opinion :
''The Watterson Expressway is a new limited
access Federal-aid highway. It has been planned
and is being constructed to connect U. S. highways
42, 60, 31E, -and 31W in such a way as to enable
traffic to proceed from:either of said highways to
the other without going through the business section of the city of Louisville. One-third of the
right of way cost and one-half of the construction
cost are to be paid by the Federal government.
The new highway crosses, at various points, numerous established highways upon which Southern
Bell has for many years maintained its poles,
wires, and conduits. At certain points, it includes
for a short distance portions of previously established public highways. At such points, it is necessary that the telephone company's facilities be
removed and relocated in order to construct the
new Expressway.''
Based upon this fact situation, the Court ruled as follows :
''We take judicial notice of the fact that most of
the highway construction in Kentucky has occurred during the past thirty years. If' we accept
appellant's narrow construction of its legislative
11
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franchise, the state would have been required to
locate or relocate its principal roads built within
that time with the primary object of avoiding interference with appellant's facilities rather than
conforming to the convenience and safety of the
traveling public. The necessary alternative to location of its roads so as not to affect appellant's
facilities would have been that the state should pay
for the removal and location of the poles and lines
which interfered with construction of new highways or improvement or reconstruction of existing
roads. If construed as requiring removal and relocation at the expense of the state, the franchise
was in violation of Article II, §33, of our Third
Constitution, which was carried over into Section
177 of our present constitution, and provided:
'' 'The credit of this Commonwealth shall not
be given or loaned in aid of any person,
association, municipality, or corporation.' ''
In addition to the five states noted above, seven state
legislatures adopted statutes similar to or identical with
Chapter 53 of the 1957 Session Laws of Utah; and the
courts of each of these seven states have had occasion to
rule upon the validity and effect of such a statute. Again,
we feel it necessary to cite these cases and comment upon
them and, in the order in which we propose to discuss
them, the cases cited are from the states of Texas, ~Iaine,
New Hampshire, Minnesota, Tennessee, New Mexico and
Idaho.
In State of Texas v. City of Dallas, 319 S.W. 2d 767,
the state sought a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of a statute similar to the Utah statute in
question here. Joined as defendants, in addition to the

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

City of Dallas, were the City of Austin, Southern Union
Gas Company, Lone Star Gas Company, Dallas Power
and Light Company and Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company. In addition to other grounds not material to
the present controversy, it was urged that the statute was
invalid and in violation of the Texas Constitution as a
gift or loan of the credit of the state and as a release of
the obligations of corporations and individuals. In sustaining the constitutionality of the statute, the intermediate Texas appellate court indulges in many citations and
we are not impressed with the reasoning advanced in support of the ruling. We are advised that this case is on
appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas and we are not
informed that a decision has been rendered as of the date
of this writing.
Both of the cases from Maine and New Hampshire are
cited as Opinion of the Justices, the former at 132 A. 2d
440, and the latter at 132 A. 2d 613. Both cases arose from
a request by the state legislature to the State Supreme
Court requesting an advisory opinion as to the constitutionality of pending legislation similar to that enacted in
Utah as Chapter 53 of the 1957 Session Laws. In the
Maine case, the court found the statute to be constitutional
as long as the funds for the payment of relocation costs
did not come from that fund reserved by the Maine Constitution for the construction and reconstruction of high"'"ays. The court did not construe that language to include
the relocation of a utility facility. The New Hampshire
decision held that the legislature may declare the reloca13
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tion of utility facilities to be a part of highway construction and to be paid out of highway funds.
'.: May we note that in neither case was any inquiry
directed to any constitutional provitli.on similar to those
in our Utah Constitution; and may we call the Court's
attention to the fact that, under the practice in Maine and
New Hampshire, an opinion of the justices is not an opinion of the Court. It is construed as the giving of. advice
by the individual members of the Court and is not binding in an adversary proceeding. See Martin v. Maine Saving Barnk (Maine), 147 A. 2d 137, and Opinion of Justices,
76 N. H. 597, 74A. 490.
In the Minnesota case of Min.neapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 N. W. 2d 642, the company under agreement
with the Commissioner of Highways undertook the relocation of its utilities and thereafter sought reimbursement
for the cost of such relocation. A summary judgment
:'Was entered in favor of the company and an appeal was
taken by the Highway Commissioner. Minnesota in 1957
h_ad enacted a statute similar to Chapter 53 of the 1957
S~ssion Laws of Utah and reimbursement was sought
under that statute. The defense to reimbursement was
based upon the contention that the statute in question was
violative of the Minnesota Constitution on five grounds,
namely: (1) That it diverted funds for a nonhighway
purpose; (2) That it authorized the expenditure of funds
for a private purpose and that it constituted a loan or gift
of the credit of the state; (3) That it constituted the contracting of debts for works of internal improvement; (4)
14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

That it granted a special or exclusive privilege, immunity
or franchise to a corporaion; and ( 5) That it impaired the
obligation of a contract.
Although the Minnesota Court resolved all five questions in favor of the constitutionality of the statute, only
the discussion as to subdivision (2) above is of importance
to the matter before this Court. In finding that there was
no loan of the state's credit, the Court examined the public
nature of utilities and the express purpose of the statute
and then made the following observation:
' ' * * * The realities of the situation are that the
people of Minnesota would suffer economically if
the state failed to take advantage of Federal aid
made available to the privately and municipally
owned utilities of this state under the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1956, in 70 Stat. 383, 23 U. S. C. A.
§ 162. The Federal-aid program is to be financed
out of Federal funds, presumably resulting from
Federal taxes contributed in part by the people of
this state. If the utilities located in this state must
undertake relocation of their facilities without a
right to reimbursement, their costs will be substantially increased and this in turn will be reflected in
higher utility rates in Minnesota communities.
Furthermore, to the extent that other states effectuate Federal aid to their utilities and Minnesota
does not, the people of Minnesota will be paying
Federal taxes which will benefit the people of the
other states but which will not benefit the people
of Minnesota. The resulting economic benefit to
the people of Minnesota from an authorization of
these expenditures is a benefit to the community
as a whole."

15
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We find it difficult to accept the reasoning that a
statute should be found constitutional because it will operate to the benefit of the citizens of the state and because
a contrary ruling would cause the citizens of that state to
suffer tax-wise. We believe it proper to consider that
.wherever moneys are to be made available through federal sources if one state gains financially another state
must suffer some financial loss. The argument advanced
in the Minnesota case would have the effect of holding
the statute in question constitutional where a benefit is
derived and unconstitutional if a financial loss were to
ensue. It is difficult for us to conceive that the same
statute will be declared constitutional or unconstitutional
depending entirely upon whether or not a particular state
will or will not reap a financial advantage therefrom.
The Minnesota Constitution, Article 9, Section 10,
provides:
''The credit of the state shall never be given or
loaned in aid of any individual, association or
corporation * * *. ''
The case of Minneapolis Ga.s Co. v. Zimmerman, supra,
holds that this provision does not prevent ''the legislature from, by prospective action (that is by an enactment
prior to the ordering of a relocation of utility facilities
or prior to the commencement of a great public 'vork
requiring such relocation), fixing the conditions of performance and making provisions for the future recognition of claims for damages founded on equity and justice,
although such claims would otherwise be damnum absque
in.juria and unenforceable against the state.''
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We submit that the Utah Constitution is not suseeptible of the same interpretation and that the use of
the language ''the Legislature shall not authorize the
state • • • to lend its credit • • * '' does not permit of
legislative action to the contrary even if it be on a prospective basis.
The remaining three cases have found the reimbursement provision of the relocation statutes to be invalid
based upon the Constitution of the state involved. The
first case is State of Tenrnessee v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 319 S. W. 2d 90. This action was brought in
the name of the state on the relation of the Commissioner
of Highways for a declaratory judgment seeking a
declaration as to the constitutionality of a utility relocation statute substantially the same as the one passed by
the Utah Legislature. The court discussed the purpose
sought to be accomplished, found it to be neither a state
or a public purpose and said:
''If the Legislature is without authority under the
Constitution to enact a law, the situation is the
same as though there were no attempted enactment. Since the Constitution forbids the State
from giving, or lending its credit'* * * to or in aid
of any person, association, company, corporation
or municipality,' it is immaterial whether there is
an attempt to have public monies paid out under
the guise of legislative sanction.
''We think that the basic test under this Section
of our Constitution is whether the expenditure is
for a State purpose. In the present case the primary purpose served by the expenditure is for the
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convenience and benefit of the utilities, the purpose cannot be public. * * * ''
~~

may be noted that this case was the subje_ct of a re_h..earing granted by the Tennessee _court and the opinion
on rehearing reasserted the invalidity of the statute. ·A
~oncurring opinion offered the observation that "if by it~
·fiat the legislature can authorize the expenditure of these
large sums on properties in which the state has no :finan·cial interest and no control other than the_ regulatory
powers over any corporation 'affected with a public inter.est,' then I see no way to restrain the legislature within
the limits of Article II, Section 31 of our State Constitution, whenever it may decide to do equity according to its
own conception. ''
_May we offer the further observation and urge upon
t.he Court that, if the state legislature may declare it to
be a public purpose and require that the state pay the
costs of the relocation of the utility facilities, it may in
the first instance require the state to pay all of the initial
·cost of locating the utility on the public highway. We
submit that such a construction ·would wholly negative
the constitutional limitation without a constitutional
amendment.
The second case is State Hightvay Commission v.
Southern} Union Gas Co., 65 N. M. 84, 332 P. 2d 1007. In
this case the declaratory judgment procedure was again
used to determine the cons~itutionality of the utility relocation statute passed by the New l\Iexico legislature. The
act is a.gain substantially the same as the one under
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attack in the instant case. The New Mexico Constitution
prohibits a donation of state funds in aid of a private
corporation and also prohibits the release of an existing
obligation. In determining the relocation statute to be
repugnant to these sections of the Constitution, the New
rvrexico Supreme Court quoted from the recent case of
Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 507, 100 S. E. 2d 268, as
follows:
''The removal and relocation of utility facilities
is not a necessary or usual adjunct to the construction of highways. State-aid highways can be and
are constructed and maintained without any utility
facilities being located on their rights-of-way.
Utility facilities are placed thereon purely for the
convenience of the political subdivisions or authorities controlling the utility and serve no useful
or desirable purpose in the construction and
maintenance of the highway itself and serve no
convenience of the highway or the highway department.
Continuing the New Mexico Court said:
''In conclusion, we would answer the main argument of the appellee that relocation of these utilities is a public governmental function by stating
that the construction of highways is unquestionably a public governmental function but that we
disagree as to relocation of utility facilities. High\vays are constructed by the state on state-owned
rights-of-way for the use of the public. The Southern Union Gas Company, in laying its gas lines, is
acting solely for the benefit of the utility. The line
is the property of the utility and to be used solely
by it, neither the state nor the public having any
right to use these lines. The Southern Union Gas
Company is not a subordinate governmental
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agency nor is it fulfilling a governmental function
although it is serving a highly useful purpose in
the great American free enterprise tradition by
furnishing for profit an essential commodity to
the people of this state.''
And the New Mexico Court concluded as follows:
''Much has been said concerning the power of the
legislature to reimburse the utility on the basis of
equity and justice. That the legislature has the
power to be equitable and just we may admit, but
that power is restricted by the Constitution. Other\Vise the prohibition against a donation would have
no meaning or effect. As stated in State ex rel.
Sena v. Trujillo, ( 46 N.M. 361, 129 P. 2d 333) 'the
constitution makes no distinction as between ''donations," whether they be for a good cause or a
questionable one. It prohibits them all * * *.' "
The third case in this group was decided by the Idaho
Supreme Court on October 2, 1958, and has not yet been
reported. It is entitled State of Idaho v. Idaho Power
Company a,rnd Moun.fa,in States Telephone and Telegraph
Company. The same declaratory judgment action was
brought on behalf of the state to test the same type of
utility relocation statute. The Idaho Constitution, Article
8, Section 2, is almost identical \vith its Utah counterpart
and reads as follows:
"The eredit of the state shall not, in anY manner,
be given, or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual,
association, municipality or corporation.''
In holding the relocation statute invalid, the Idaho Court
said:
"Clearly, the legislature at all times has recognized, and continues to recognize that all roads,
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streets and highways are held in trust by the state
and its political subdivisions for use by the public;
also, that the granting by the state or political
subdivision of a vested or permanent property
right or interest in any public street or highway
would not only be violative of such public trust,
but would result in diminution of the quantum of
ownership of the public in its public thoroughfares; and that so to do would constitute the giving
or loaning of the credit of the state to or in aid of
an individual, municipality or corporation, violative of Idaho Constitution, Article 8, Section 2,
or a gift of the public property in violation of the
implied limitations of the Constitution.''
The decision of the Idaho Court is lengthy and contains
a good resume of most of the cases dealing with the subject, and of more than passing interest is the reference
to the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
2 L. Ed. 60, and to the following statement from Chief
Justice Marshall :
''The Constitution is either a superior, paramount
law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a
level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it. If the former part of the alternative
be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then
"\Vritten Constitutions are absurd attempts, on the
part of the people, to limit a power in its own
nature illimitable. ''
And may we refer to this Court's recent decision in
the case of Moon Lake Electric Association and U intah
Basin Telephone Association v. Utah State Tax Commission, decided on October 29, 1959, and not yet reported. In
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holding ·that certain acts· dealing with the taxation of
cooperative nonprofit corp~rations were unconstitutional,
this Court said :
''The petitioners assert that the Sections 16-6-16
and 17 are just and wise legislation. They feel that
the public will benefit from the effect of such
statutes. Unqoubtedly the majority of the legislators concurred 'in -this view. As interesting as petitioners' views thereon are, this court cannot
properly consider them here. The analogy to the
· · situation presented in State v. Armstrong (17
Utah 166, 53 Pac. 98), is noted. There the section
under consideration provided, so far as material,
that a board of equalization 'may remit or abate
the taxes· of any insane, idiot, infirm or indigent
person to an amount not exceeding $10.00 for the
current year.' The court there said: 'In arriving
at the conclusions that the provision of the statute
in controversy is null and void, we were not unmindful of the fact that the question whether an
enactment of the legislature is void because of its
repugnancy to the constitution is always one of
much delicacy, and in a doubtful case should seldom, if ever' be decided in the affirmative. Where,
however, the mind is convinced of the unconstitutionality of the law, the duty which devolves upon
the court to declare it so is imperative, even where,
as in this case, the statute appears to be in consonance with justice and humanity. That the law
itself would be beneficent can be of no avail in this
case, because its effect and operation would be to
exempt property, against the mandate of the fundamental law.' "
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that Chapter 53 of the
1957 Session Laws of Utah is repugnant to both Sections
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27 and 31 of Article VI of the Constitution of the State
of Utah to the extent that the chapter directs the reim~
bursement of utilities for their costs of relocating facilities presently on public rights-of-way.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER L. BUDGE
.Attorney General
ROBERT B. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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